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Introducing Revised Article 9 of
The Uniform Commercial Code
by John L. McCabe and Arthur H. Travers
On July 1, 2001, a comprehensive revi-
sion ("Revision") of Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("UCC") became
effective in Colorado and all but a handful
of other jurisdictions. By January 2, 2002,
it will be effective in all jurisdictions.1 A
great deal already has been written about
revised Article 9, much of it more detailed
than this article, and a great deal more will
be written as practitioners gain experi-
ence with revised Article 9 in operation.
This article is intended to be a brief intro-
duction for Colorado lawyers to the issues
that are created by revised Article 9. How-
ever, this article should not be considered
a substitute for more detailed treatments.
INTRODUCTION
Article 9 was the great success story of
the original UCC. It replaced the complex
and confusing regime of independent se-
curity devices with a single device, the se-
curity interest in personal property, and it
established a single filing system within
each enacting state as the primary mech-
anism for giving notice to adverse claim-
ants of that security interest. The Revi-
sion builds on that success. It preserves the
core of the original Article 9, but it pushes
out the boundaries to include transactions
such as genuine consignments and gen-
uine sales of promissory notes that were
not covered by original Article 9,2 as well
as secured transactions in collateral, such
as deposit accounts and commercial tort
claims, that had been excluded from Arti-
cle 9.3 Indeed, the Revision includes as po-
tential collateral some forms of property
that are not as yet in widespread use.
4
The broadening of the scope of Article 9
has necessitated the inclusion of a great
many new provisions and the revision of
many others. The overall effect is that some
of the elegance of the original Article 9 has
been lost. The Revision is substantially
bulkier than its predecessor, with approx-
imately 50,000 words of statutory text,
compared to slightly more than 20,000 for
its predecessor. It also appears that the
drafters believed that the Revision is less
user friendly than the original; they in-
cluded 120,000 words of Official Com-
ments, compared to 50,000 words for the
original.
However, not every feature of original
Article 9 was a success. The rules prescrib-
ing the jurisdiction in which to file a financ-
ing statement often required multiple fil-
ings or created such uncertainty about the
jurisdiction in which to file that multiple
filings were the prudent course. Original
Article 9 also offered states the option of
requiring local filing instead of or in addi-
tion to central filing of financing state-
ments. The Revision effects a major change
in the rules specifying the jurisdiction in
which to file and requires all filing within
a particular jurisdiction to be made cen-
trally (unless the collateral is related close-
ly to real estate). When all adjustments to
these changes have been made, the Revi-
sion should substantially reduce filing and
searching costs and, thus, the cost of cred-
it to debtors. In the short-term, the changes
have required the inclusion of transition
rules that are a bit tricky to learn.
Apart from these major changes, the Re-
vision incorporates a number of specific
changes and clarifications. Finally, the Col-
orado legislature included a number of
non-uniform provisions. This article at
least touches on all of these topics.
FINANCING STATEMENT
FILING RULES
From the inception of Article 9, the lo-
cation of the collateral has been the pri-
mary determinant of the place to file a fi-
nancing statement to perfect a security in-
terest in tangible personal property. The
exceptions to this principle were limited,
for all practical purposes, to cases in which
the location was difficult to determine or
the collateral had no fixed physical loca-
tion (accounts, chattel, paper, general in-
tangibles and mobile goods). In these cas-
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es, the location of the debtor was key5 As a
consequence of this approach, a secured
party seeking to perfect its interest in tan-
gible collateral disbursed across state lines
was compelled to file financing statements
in multiple jurisdictions. The not inconsid-
erable inefficiencies of learning and moni-
toring the filing requirements of various
states, administering the continuation of
multiple financing statements, and, in
some instances, the retention of local coun-
sel, became part of the cost of business
passed on to the debtor. In addition, the lo-
cation of the collateral could change, often
without the knowledge or consent of the
secured party.
Revised Article 9 takes the dramatic
step of eliminating this long-standing "lo-
cation of collateral" (or "situs") test. As of
July 1, 2001, the state whose filing rules
govern perfection in collateral other than
real property-related collateral6 is the state
in which the debtor, rather than the collat-
eral, is located.7 Because the debtor can be
located in only one jurisdiction, the new ap-
proach eliminates the need for a multi-
plicity of UCC filings. To determine the lo-
cation of the debtor, UCC § 9-307 catego-
rizes various types of debtors and desig-
nates the deemed location of each, as fol-
lows:
1. A registered organization 8 (for exam-
ple, a corporation, limited partnership, or
limited liability company) is located in the
state of its organization. Thus, a Colorado
corporation is located in Colorado, and a
limited liability company formed under
Kansas law is located in Kansas. The use
of the state of organization establishes an
easily understood and verifiable test that
should simplify the filing process.
2. An unregistered organization, such
as a general partnership, is located at its
place of business or, if more than one such
place exists, at its chief executive office.
This is the same location test found in old
Article 9, but it is now limited to unregis-
tered organizations.
3. A foreign debtor otherwise deemed to
be located in a jurisdiction without a filing
system for the perfection and priority of
security interests is located in the District
of Columbia.
4. An entity organized under the laws of
the United States is located in the District
of Columbia, unless the law of the United
States under which such an entity is or-
ganized designates a state of location or
authorizes the entity to designate its state
of location, in which event such designat-
ed state is the entity's location. In the au-
thors' view, this rule is surprisingly vague,
and the official comments to new Article 9
are not particularly helpful. Consequently,
it is difficult to determine the location of a
national bank for purposes of applying Ar-
ticle 9 filing rules. At least one state has
changed the Uniform Act formulation in
an attempt to bring some clarity to this
process.9
5. The United States is located in the
District of Columbia.
6. A branch or agency of a foreign bank
is located in the state in which it is licensed
or, if licensed in more than one state, in
the state or jurisdiction determined under
the rules applicable to registered organi-
zations formed under the laws of the Unit-
ed States.
7. An individual is located at his or her
principal residence.
8. A foreign air carrier is located at the
office designated for service of process un-
der applicable law.
The application of the new filing rules
in most cases will lead to fewer required
filings and more certainty as to the proper
filing location. Assume that the secured
party faces the following facts: The debtor,
a Delaware corporation, has tangible col-
lateral located in California, Kansas, Mis-
sissippi and Texas and perhaps other
states, maintains its only operating facili-
ty in Texas, and keeps a small corporate
office for certain executive officers in Col-
orado. The obligation is secured by all of
the personal property of the debtor ex-
cluding, for purposes of the example, real
property-related collateral, and collateral
not primarily governed by the UCC filing
system, such as airplanes. Where would
the secured party file to perfect a security
interest in all of this collateral? The an-
swer under new Article 9 is the Secretary
of State of Delaware. The debtor is unmis-
takably located in Delaware, and the loca-
tion of the debtor determines the place of
filing.
Contrast that simple solution with pri-
or law under which at least six separate
filings would have been prudent-one in
each of the states in which collateral is
known to exist, one in Colorado on the
chance that the corporate office there is
the debtor's chief executive office, and an
additional local filing in Mississippi be-
cause it is a dual filing jurisdiction. Even
after six filings, the secured party would
be at some risk under old Article 9 in the
event the tangible collateral was actually
found in more than the states identified
or, as is often the case, the collateral was
later moved by the debtor to one or more
additional jurisdictions. As this example
shows, the simplified, predictable approach
to filing adopted in the Revision is prefer-
able to prior law, even taking into account
the possible occasional need for an out-of-
state filing where none might have been
necessary under prior law.
Over the last several years, Colorado
has moved to a predominantly central fil-
ing system. Beginning January 1, 2000,
all UCC filings in Colorado were required
to be made with the Secretary of State, ex-
cept for certain real property-related fil-
ings. This system continues unchanged
under the Revision. As was the case under
old Article 9, security interests in fixtures
of a transmitting utility may be perfected
by a filing with the Secretary of State.10
TRANSITION
When new Article 9 became effective on
July 1, 2001, it became the governing law
for existing as well as post-effective-date
security interests." Generally, if what was
done to create and perfect a security in-
terest under prior law complies with the
new law, nothing special is required after
the effective date. If that is not the case,
the secured party risks losing its lien or at
least the priority of that lien if appropri-
ate steps are not taken.
Pre-effective-Date Security
Interests Perfected by Filing
As noted above, the proper place to file
financing statements under the Revision
may be different from the proper place un-
der old Article 9. However, the Revision
does not immediately invalidate the prior
filing. Instead, UCC § 9-705(c) of the Revi-
sion provides that a financing statement
properly filed under old Article 9 will re-
main effective until the earlier of the nor-
mal lapse date (determined under the old
law) and June 30, 2006.12 An example of
the application of this rule may be instruc-
tive. Assume that a financing statement
was properly filed in the state of Colora-
do-the location of the debtor's chief exec-
utive office--on January 1, 2000, to per-
fect the secured party's security interest
in the debtor's accounts, and that the debt-
or is a "registered organization" incorpo-
rated in the state of Delaware. Under the
grace period afforded by UCC § 9-705(c),
this filing will remain effective, without
further action by the secured party, until
January 1, 2005-the normal lapse date
for this filing-even though under new
Article 9 it is filed in the wrong jurisdic-
tion (that is, Colorado rather than Dela-
ware).
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Pre-effective-Date Security
Interests Perfected by
Means Other Than Filing
As a general proposition, in cases in
which the security interest was perfected
by some means other than filing (for ex-
ample, the secured party's possession) and
the security interest would not be perfect-
ed under the Revision, secured parties will
have one year (until June 30,2002) to com-
ply with the new Article 9 rules. 3 Again,
a few examples may be useful:
1. Under old Article 9, notice by a se-
cured party to a bailee of the existence of
the secured party's security interest in the
collateral would be sufficient to perfect a
possessory security interest. 4 No acknowl-
edgment from the bailee that it was hold-
ing the collateral for the secured party was
required. Under new Article 9, however,
perfection does not occur unless and until
the bailee gives such acknowledgment. 5
Assuming the secured party had not ob-
tained such acknowledgment prior to July
1, 2001, its lien would become unperfect-
ed on July 1, 2002, unless it obtained the
required acknowledgment or perfected its
security interest in some other way (for
example, filing a financing statement or
direct possession) prior to that date.
2. Deposit accounts were excluded from
old Article 9. A creditor could, however, ob-
tain a common law lien to perfect its secu-
rity interest in the deposit account. Such
deposit accounts are now within the pur-
view of Article 9 and may be perfected by
(and only by) the secured party's taking
control of the deposit account, usually
through a control agreement. 6 A secured
party with a common law lien on the de-
posit account prior to July 1, 2001, will
have until June 30,2002, to obtain control
of the deposit account under Article 9. Fail-
ure to establish control will result in loss
of perfection on July 1, 2002.
3. Under new Article 9, a security inter-
est in investment property securing a con-
sumer transaction will not attach unless
the collateral is described in the security
agreement with specificity. 7 A description
by type was adequate under the prior law.
A secured party in a consumer transac-
tion relying on the now inadequate de-
scription would have its security interest
invalidated on July 1, 2001, except for the
one-year grace period. (This is true even
though the financing statement initially
filed to perfect the security interest would
remain effective under provisions de-
scribed above. Under the Revision, the se-
curity agreement is no longer effective to
create an enforceable security interest.) In
this instance, new Article 9 gives the se-
cured party until June 30, 2002, to per-
suade the debtor to enter into a new or
amended security agreement that provides
a description of the investment property
that satisfies the Revision's requirements.
The transition provisions of new Article
9 enable a smoother transition into the
new law, but not without cost. Because pre-
effective-date financing statements will
remain valid for up to five years, a secured
party contemplating a credit extension
must conduct a UCC search under the fil-
ing protocols of both former and new Arti-
cle 9 for the foreseeable future. The extra
effort will not be limited to the search for
the existence (or not) of financing state-
ments in multiple filing offices. A lien
searcher also will need to be cognizant that
collateral descriptions in pre-effective-date
financing statements using terms that
have different meanings under old and
new Article 9 may perfect the earlier filing
secured party's lien under both definitions.
Amendment of Financing
Statements
A pre-effective-date financing state-
ment that is filed in the office that is the
right office under both old and new Arti-
cle 9 may be amended, 8 continued, as-
signed, and terminated under rules that
are essentially the same as have been in
place for years. 9 As is currently the case,
a continuation statement must be filed
within six months prior to the lapse of the
affected financing statement. Such filing
will extend the effectiveness of the financ-
ing statement for an additional five years
from the date the continued financing
statement would have become ineffective
in the absence of the continuation state-
ment.20 Neither prior nor new Article 9 re-
quires the signature of the debtor or se-
cured party on the continuation statement.
Prior Colorado law required the secured
party's signature on an amendment delet-
ing collateral. New Article 9 requires the
signature of neither party, but does re-
quire that any amendment (or termina-
tion, release, or assignment) be appropri-
ately authorized.
2'
It is important to note that the contin-
uation statement must comply with the
content requirements of new Article 922
and to add whatever additional informa-
tion UCC §§ 9-502 and 9-516 require in
initial financing statements (such as an
indication of whether the debtor is an in-
dividual or organization) so that the old fi-
nancing statement and the continuation
statement, taken together, comply with
the content requirements of new Article
9.' Further, as discussed below, if the Re-
vision's changes in the meaning of certain
terms (such as accounts) render the origi-
nal collateral description inaccurate, the
collateral description in the financing state-
ment should be appropriately amended to
conform to the parties' intentions prior to
continuation of the financing statement.
A financing statement filed in the prop-
er location under old Article 9 but in an im-
proper location under new Article 9 re-
mains effective, but may not be amended,
continued, or assigned by a filing in the im-
proper jurisdiction. This financing state-
ment may be continued only by the filing
of a new financing statement in the prop-
er filing office under the new Article 9 rules
(a so-called 'in lieu" initial financing state-
ment).24 The "in lieu" financing statement
may be filed at any time during the period
that the pre-effective-date financing state-
ment is effective, without regard to the six-
month window applicable to regular con-
tinuation statements and, once filed, will
be effective for five years from the date it
is filed.
25
The "in lieu" financing statement must
(1) meet all of the requirements of the Re-
vision; (2) identify the pre-effective-date fi-
nancing statement that it is replacing by
filing office, the date of filing, and file num-
bers for both the pre-effective-date financ-
ing statement and the most recent contin-
uation statement; and (3) state that the
existing financing statement remains ef-
fective. The "in lieu" financing statement
may cover more than one pre-effective-date
financing statement and may be filed with-
out the further authorization of the debt-
or. As is the case with respect to the con-
tinuation of financing statements filed in
the proper new Article 9 location, if chang-
es in the definition of collateral categories
in new Article 9 make the old description
inaccurate, the new financing statement
should describe the collateral under the
new Article 9 definitions.
26
Because it may become necessary at a
later date to prove that the new financing
statement continued the lien originally
perfected by a financing statement in an
old Article 9 jurisdiction, it will be useful
for a secured party to obtain and preserve
in a permanent record a certified copy of
the old Article 9 financing statement. Al-
though the old Article 9 filing jurisdiction
will retain the old financing statement for
some period of time, most jurisdictions
purge their files of lapsed financing state-
ments at some point (often one year after
the lapse of the original financing state-
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ment).2 If that were to occur, it might oth-
erwise be difficult to prove that the secured
party had a continuously perfected financ-
ing statement on file from the original fi-
nancing statement filing date.
A financing statement filed in the right
place under old Article 9 but the wrong
place under new Article 9 may not be
amended by a filing in the new Article 9
jurisdiction. The secured party must file
an "in lieu" financing statement in the
proper new Article 9 jurisdiction before
the end of the grace period if it desires to
amend the existing financing statement.2s
On the other hand, a pre-effective-date fi-
nancing statement may be terminated by
a filing in the old Article 9 jurisdiction un-
til an "in lieu" financing statement is filed
in the new Article 9 jurisdiction. There-
after, the financing statement may be ter-
minated only by a filing in the new Article
9jurisdiction.29
New Types of Collateral
New Article 9 introduces several new
categories of collateral, including deposit
accounts, commercial tort claims, software,
letter of credit rights, health-care-insur-
ance receivables, and payment intangi-
bles.30 In addition, the definition of"ac-
count" is modified to include certain rights
to payment under old Article 9 that were
classified as general intangibles. The term
"accountf under prior law, was for the most
part limited to a right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered,
which excluded, among other things, rights
to payment under licenses, lottery win-
nings, and credit card receivables. 31 The
expanded definition embraces these and
other items and, in the process, reduces
the scope of the general intangible catego-
Iy.32 As stated above, this definitional shift
may require a secured party to amend its
security agreement and/or financing state-
ment to identify properly the collateral in
which it claims an interest. Failure to do
so could result in a loss of perfection as to
the collateral subject to the changed defi-
nitions.
The treatment of deposit accounts in
new Article 9, and particularly in Colora-
do's version, is complex. Deposit accounts
include demand accounts, such as check-
Seau0 & mt
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ing accounts, savings, passbook, and simi-
lar accounts maintained with a bank.u3 Ex-
cept in a few jurisdictions-Illinois and
California come to mind-these accounts
were excluded from coverage by former
Article 9.4 Any lien in them was derived
from common law or a unique non-UCC
state statutory scheme. New Article 9
brings this potentially significant collater-
al category within the more familiar and
predictable confines of the UCC, but with
some restrictions. Under the Official Text,
Article 9 continues to exclude security in-
terests in deposit accounts in consumer
transactions. 35 The assumed rationale for
this exclusion is that consumers should
neither be allowed nor forced to make use
of this collateral source under the relative-
ly efficient lien processes of the UCC. "As-
sumed rationale" is the term used because
nothing in Article 9 prohibits a consumer
from using funds from such deposits to ac-
quire types of property that may be used
as collateral under the Revision.
The Colorado version ofArticle 9 extends
this exclusion of deposit accounts as col-
lateral in two non-uniform ways. First, Col-
orado establishes "consumer deposit ac-
count'0 6 as a new collateral category and
excludes from Article 9 an assignment of
an interest in such deposit accounts in all
transactions, not just consumer transac-
tions.37 Second, Colorado's version of re-
vised Article 9 excludes from its scope the
assignment of all deposit accounts-con-
sumer and non-consumer-as collateral
in any transaction in which the "principal
or maximum line of credit on a revolving
loan account" is less than $100,000, as well
as in consumer transactions.
38
The original version of new Article 9 in-
cluded municipal financing transactions
within its scope. Historically, liens against
governmental entities were created and
perfected, if at all, through a patchwork of
common law liens and specific statutory
provisions enacted for the benefit of one
governmental agency or another. The draft-
ers of new Article 9 believed that munici-
palities and their counsel would find it ef-
ficient and safer (from a creditor's rights
perspective) to rely on the well-understood
UCC lien creation, perfection, and priority
rules, rather than the occasionally byzan-
tine and certainly diverse rules under
which municipalities operated. Such belief
was mistaken. Municipalities and their
counsel were adamant, both in Colorado
and elsewhere, that the prior law was pref-
erable. The result, in Colorado at least, is
that municipal finance remains outside the
scope ofArticle 9.39
New Article 9 also makes it clear that a
seller of accounts retains no interest in
the property sold.40 This clarification im-
plicitly overrules Octagon Gas Systems,
Inc. v. Rimmer,41 a case that had cast doubt
on the feasibility in Colorado and other
Tenth Circuit states of certain sophisticat-
ed asset securitization programs.
COLLATERAL
DESCRIPTIONS
As under prior law, the description of col-
lateral in a security agreement and in a fi-
nancing statement is generally sufficient
if it reasonably identifies the collateral.
42
However, several major exceptions to this
proposition should be noted. First, a de-
scription of collateral solely by reference
to type is an insufficient description of a
commercial tort claim; a deposit account;
and, in a consumer transaction, consumer
goods, a security entitlement, a securities
account, and a commodity account.43 The
requirement that a deposit account be
identified with specificity is a Colorado
non-uniform provision, and is a compan-
ion to other changes made in Colorado to
new Article 9 that appear to be designed
to restrict the availability of deposit ac-
counts as collateral.
With respect to commercial tort claims,
the security interest will not extend to af-
ter-acquired claims, which effectively
means that commercial tort claims sub-
ject to Article 9 will be in existence at the
time the security agreement is created. A
description of a commercial tort claim by
reference to a pending lawsuit would be
sufficient, but something less specific also
would be satisfactory. The Official Com-
ment to UCC § 9-108 says that "a descrip-
tion such as 'all tort claims arising out of
the explosion of debtor's factory' would suf-
fice ....."
Second, a description of collateral as "all
the debtor's assets" or "all the debtor's per-
sonal property" or similar "supergeneric"
description is insufficient when used in the
security agreement.44 Such invalidation is
consistent with interpretations of former
Article 9 from many jurisdictions.4 On the
other hand, UCC § 9-504(2) of the Revision
expressly validates collateral descriptions
in the financing statement that indicate
the financing statement covers "all assets
or all personal property." Notwithstanding
this statutory approval, a secured party's
security interest is limited to the collater-
al in which the debtor granted a security
interest.
A person is entitled to file a financing
statement only to the extent that it is au-
thorized by the debtor," and if the secured
party is relying on the debtor's authenti-
cating a security agreement for its author-
ization, it would not be authorized to file
a financing statement that included as col-
lateral property in which no security in-
terest was granted.47 The filing would be
ineffective as to such property' Moreover,
if the filing caused loss to the debtor, the
secured party would be liable for actual
damages and, if the collateral were con-
sumer goods, would be liable for statutory
damages. 49 A secured party desiring to
take advantage of the greater flexibility
allowed in financing statement descrip-
tions had better obtain the debtor's ex-
press authorization to file a financing state-
ment containing such a description.
CONTENT OF FINANCING
STATEMENTS
New Article 9 provides that a financing
statement is sufficient if it (1) contains the
name of the debtor and the name of the
secured party or its representative and (2)
properly describes the collateral. It is no
longer necessary to include the debtor's
social security number or federal identifi-
cation number in the financing statement.
However, the simplicity of the require-
ments of UCC § 9-502 is misleading. Even
if the financing statement contains the
above noted items, UCC § 9-520(a) re-
quires5° the filing officer to reject an initial
financing statement that:
1) is not communicated by a method or
medium of communication authorized
by the filing office;
2) is not accompanied by the requisite fil-
ing fee;
3) fails to provide the mailing address
of the secured party;
4) fails to provide the mailing address
of the debtor;
5) fails to indicate whether the debtor is
an individual or an organization;
6) if the debtor is an organization, fails
to identify the debtor's type of organi-
zation, jurisdiction of organization,
and organizational identification num-
ber assigned to the debtor by its state
of incorporation (or an indication that
the debtor has no such number);
7) if the debtor is an individual, fails to
identify the debtor's last name as
such;
8) is illegible; or
9) ifa real-estate-related filing, such as
a fixture filing, fails to provide a suffi-
cient description of the real property
to which it relates.
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These reasons form the exclusive basis
for rejection. The filing office may not le-
gitimately refuse a filing for any other rea-
son (assuming the filing office is the one
specified in revised Article 9). If the filing
officer refuses to accept a financing state-
ment for reasons other than the ones iden-
tified above, the financing statement is
nevertheless effective, except as against a
purchaser (which includes a secured par-
ty) of the collateral who gives value in rea-
sonable reliance on the absence of a rec-
ord of the financing statement in the fil-
ing officer's files.5'
On the other hand, it is obvious that the
filing office will not be in a position to know
if some of this required information is in-
accurate and will accept for filing many fi-
nancing statements in which this is the
case. Should that occur (or should the rare
case occur in which some of this informa-
tion is altogether omitted), the financing
statement will nevertheless be effective
because only the information required by
UCC § 9-502 is a precondition to effective-
ness.
New Article 9 attempts to tighten the
requirements for accuracy in the descrip-
tion of the debtor's name in the financing
statement. The basic rule is that the name
of the debtor as stated in the financing
statement must match exactly the legal
name of the debtor.5 2 This approach puts
a high premium on knowing the name of
the debtor. However, a debtor's name will
not be deemed seriously misleading and
thus will be adequate for financing state-
ment purposes if the search logic used by
the filing office would in fact identify the
name used in the financing statement in
a search under the debtor's actual legal
name.
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Accordingly, ifACME Tools, Inc., for ex-
ample, is inaccurately identified in the fi-
nancing statement as "ACME Tool Corpo-
ration," but a search of the records using
the search logic of the state in question
under the name "ACME Tools, Inc." would
reveal the financing statement showing
the name "ACME Tool Corporation," the
name of the debtor will not be deemed se-
riously misleading. Although many states
use software that is designed to capture
variations of a name, a secured party takes
unnecessary risks by relying on search log-
ic to save it from its failure to use the pre-
cise legal name of the debtor.M4
As under prior Colorado law, no signa-
ture or other authentication is required on
a financing statement or a continuation
statement. In a departure from Colorado
prior law, the Revision also eliminates the
requirement of a signature or other au-
thentication on any amendment, includ-
ing an assignment, termination or partial
release. In all cases, a financing statement
and an amendment to a financing state-
ment must be authorized by the debtor.
This authorization is automatically pro-
vided by the debtor through execution of
the related security agreement.55
METHODS OF PERFECTION
Perfection under new Article 9 may be
achieved by filing, possession, or control,
depending on the type of collateral. In ad-
dition, perfection is automatic (that is, the
secured party's position is perfected on at-
tachment without the taking of further
action) with respect to certain collateral.
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Perfection is automatic, for example, for a
purchase money security interest in con-
sumer goods (other than automobiles), the
outright sale of a payment intangible or a
promissory note, the assignment of a
health care insurance receivable to the
provider of health care goods or services,
and an assignment of accounts or payment
intangibles that does not by itself or in con-
junction with other assignments to the
same transferee assign a significant part
of the assignor's outstanding accounts or
payment intangibles.
In a major change from prior law, new
Article 9 allows a security interest in an
instrument to be perfected by either pos-
session or filing." An instrument includes
any right to payment of a monetary obli-
gation evidenced by a writing that is not
a security agreement or lease and is of a
type that in the ordinary course of busi-
ness is transferred by delivery, such as a
promissory note."8 Investment property
(defined to include stock certificates, un-
certificated securities, and securities ac-
counts, such as accounts maintained with
a stock broker)59 also may be perfected by
filing. In each of these cases, however, a se-
curity interest perfected by possession or
control will give the secured party greater
protection against the claims of competing
interests than may be achieved by filing
alone. For example, filing against an instru-
ment or security would not constitute no-
tice precluding a later purchaser of the in-
strument or security from becoming a hold-
er in due course who would take free of
most claims and defenses, nor would such
filing have priority over a purchaser, in-
cluding a creditor, who gives value and
takes possession of the instrument in good
faith without knowledge that the purchase
violates the rights of the filing secured par-
ty.60
In some cases, perfection may be ac-
complished only by control over the collat-
eral. For example, control is the only means
of perfection of security interests in de-
posit accounts, and, unless they fit the de-
finition of a "supporting obligation,"61 let-
ter of credit rights. With respect to deposit
accounts, control occurs when the account
is with a depository institution that also is
the secured party. Moreover, it occurs at
such time as the depository institution has
agreed that it will follow the directions of
the secured party without further consent
of the debtor, as well as when the secured
party becomes the customer of the deposi-
tory institution by putting the account in
its own name. A secured party will have
control over the deposit account even
though the debtor retains a right of access
to the account.
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As under prior law, a secured party ob-
tains control over a securities account
when the securities intermediary agrees
to follow directions from the secured party
without further consent of the debtor. A
provision allowing the debtor to continue
directing investments in a securities ac-
count will not preclude a finding that the
secured party has control of that account.
This was unclear under former Article 9.6
FORECLOSURE AND
REPOSSESSION
After a debtor's default, the secured par-
ty may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dis-
pose of the collateral. The basic standard
by which the repossession is to be tested
remains commercial reasonableness:
"[Elvery aspect of a disposition of collater-
al including the method, manner, time,
place and other terms, must be commer-
cially reasonable."64 Subject to limited ex-
ceptions relating to perishable goods and
goods for which there is a recognized mar-
ket, the secured party must send an au-
thenticated notification of its intended dis-
position to specified persons.6' The "au-
thenticated notification" requirement over-
rules those cases (in states other than Col-
orado) that allowed oral notice of disposi-
tion. Old Article 9 did not specify the con-
tents of a disposition notice, and courts ap-
plied differing standards to measure the
adequacy of such notices. Article 9 speci-
fies the contents of a notice of disposition.
Except in a consumer-goods transaction,
the notification must describe the debtor
and the secured party, the collateral to be
disposed of, and the method of intended
disposition; state that the debtor is enti-
tled to an accounting (and the charge
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therefor); and state the time and place of
a public sale and the time after which any
other disposition is to be made.6
In another example of the new statute's
attempt to distinguish consumer from non-
consumer transactions, the Revision re-
quires a notice of disposition in a consum-
er-goods transaction to contain (in addi-
tion to the information required in a non-
consumer-goods transaction) a description
of any liability for a deficiency and the tele-
phone number and mailing address from
which the amount required to pay off the
debt can be obtained. It also must contain
a telephone number and mailing address
from which additional information con-
cerning the disposition and the obligation
secured is available.67 In a helpful addition,
new Article 9 includes statutorily pre-
scribed notice of disposition forms-one
for consumer-goods transactions and one
for all other transactions-which, if prop-
erly completed and sent, will be deemed to
satisfy the notice of disposition require-
ments of Article 9.68
The mailing address requirement in
each of the forms is not part of the uni-
form law but is a Colorado amendment.
Colorado also has modified the consumner-
goods transaction safe harbor form to re-
flect certain other changes made in Col-
orado regarding charges that may be made
by a secured party to a debtor providing
explanations of amounts owed.
The notice of disposition must be sent
to the debtor and each secondary obligor,
such as a guarantor. In addition, in a throw-
back to Article 9 as it existed prior to 1972,
the notice of disposition of collateral other
than consumer goods also must be sent to
any person who has notified the foreclos-
ing creditor of a claim against the collat-
eral, any person who has filed a financing
statement covering such collateral, and
any other secured party that holds a secu-
rity interest in the collateral perfected by
compliance with a certificate of title act or
other non-UCC filing statute identified in
UCC § 9-311(a).
69
In another laudable attempt to inject
more certainty into the foreclosure proc-
ess, new Article 9 provides expressly that
a notice of disposition sent after default
and ten days or more before the earliest
time of disposition set forth in the notifi-
cation is deemed an adequate period of
notice. This ten-day notice is intended as
a safe harbor, not a minimum. Thus, de-
pending on the facts, a shorter notice pe-
riod would be permissible. In consumer
transactions, no safe harbor is provided,
and the timeliness of notification is a fac-
tual matter for determination by a judge
or a jury
0
Under prior law, a secured party could,
with the consent of the debtor and in com-
pliance with certain notice requirements,
retain collateral in its possession in full
satisfaction of the debtor's obligations. It
was generally thought that these strict
foreclosure provisions of old Article 9 did
not authorize a secured party to retain the
collateral in partial satisfaction of the debt.
New Article 9 expressly authorizes such
partial strict foreclosure in non-consumer
transactions, provided certain procedural
and substantive safeguards are imple-
mented, and eliminates the requirement
that the collateral be in the secured par-
ty's possession, thus effectively extending
the possibility of a strict foreclosure to in-
tangible collateral. 71 The Revision also
provides, for the first time, that such fore-
closure terminates any subordinate secu-
rity interest and that such subordinate se-
curity interest is discharged or terminat-
ed even if the secured party fails to comply
fully with the strict foreclosure provisions
of new Article 9. Failure to so comply would
subject the secured party to damages for
noncompliance with the UCC.
Courts in a few jurisdictions, Colorado
not among them, have held that a secured
party's delay in disposition of collateral con-
stitutes constructive strict foreclosure, re-
lieving a debtor of any further obligation
to satisfy the debt. The drafters of the Re-
vision concluded that delay in disposition
was merely one of the items to be meas-
ured to determine whether a secured par-
ty had acted in a commercially reasonable
manner. If through unreasonable delay or
otherwise a creditor had failed to meet
this burden, the proper sanction would, in
their view, be the imposition of damages
rather than discharge of the debt.
Accordingly, the Official Text provides
that strict foreclosure cannot occur unless,
among other things, the secured party con-
sents in writing to acceptance of collateral
in full satisfaction of the debt.7 2 Further,
new Article 9 requires a secured party to
dispose of collateral within ninety days af-
ter it takes possession of the collateral or
such longer period as may be agreed on by
the parties after default.73 In an apparent
effort to preserve the possibility that a Col-
orado court would adopt the constructive
strict foreclosure theory, the Colorado leg-
islature deleted subsection (b) of UCC § 9-
620 requiring the secured party's consent
to any strict foreclosure. Whether the Col-
orado courts will embrace this opportuni-
ty to adopt the constructive strict foreclo-
sure doctrine is uncertain.
Old Article 9 did not specify the remedy
to be applied if a secured party failed to
comply with Article 9's collection, enforce-
ment, and disposition requirements. In
some jurisdictions, courts denied the se-
cured party the right to any deficiency in
such cases. Most jurisdictions, however,
including the state of Colorado, adopted
the so-called "rebuttable presumption" rule,
under which a secured party that failed to
comply with the disposition requirements
of the UCC had to prove that the fair mar-
ket value of the collateral disposed of was
equal to or less than the consideration re-
ceived at the foreclosure sale. Failure to
meet that burden of proof resulted in the
loss of the deficiency. New Article 9 codi-
fies this rebuttable presumption rule in
all transactions other than consumer
transactions. In the consumer context, the
courts are to decide on a case-by-case ba-
sis whether, to what extent, and under
what circumstances the secured party may
obtain a deficiency from the debtor.
In both consumer and non-consumer
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damages for the loss of any surplus occa-
sioned by the secured party's noncompli-
ance.7 4 In a consumer-goods transaction,
Article 9 now requires a secured party to
send to the debtor and any consumer obli-
gor a writing stating, among other things,
the amount of any surplus or deficiency re-
sulting from the transaction, how the se-
cured party calculated such surplus or de-
ficiency, and the source from which addi-
tional information is available. In the al-
ternative, the secured party must send a
record waiving the right to a deficiency
This explanation or waiver must be sent
after the disposition of the collateral and,
in any event, within fourteen days after
the receipt of a request for an explanation
from the debtor or consumer obligor.
7
No special safe harbor form is provided
in the new statute. Perhaps in recognition
of the newness of this requirement, new
Article 9 exempts secured parties who fail
to comply with this notice requirement
from the penalty provisions of UCC § 9-
625(c)(2), but in a non-uniform amend-
ment, the Revision repeals this exemption
on July 1, 2003.76
Foreclosing secured parties will need to
pay more attention to warranty provisions
in their foreclosure sale documents. UCC
§ 9-610(d) and (e) provide that a foreclos-
ing secured creditor gives implied warran-
ties of title unless expressly disclaimed.
Colorado, in another non-uniform amend-
ment, specifies that such disclaimer must
be given before the sale is completed. Se-
cured parties also should consider express
disclaimers of all implied warranties, par-
ticularly if they are also merchants with
respect to the collateral or are otherwise
in a position to be deemed to have given a
warranty that the collateral is fit for a par-
ticular purpose.
If collateral is sold to the foreclosing se-
cured party, a related entity or a secondary
obligor, certain "low price" rules apply, Spe-
cifically, if the proceeds are significantly
below what would have been obtained in
a disposition to an unrelated third party,
any deficiency will be calculated on the
basis of what would have been received in




In the legislative process, several chang-
es were made to the Revision to continue
in effect several non-uniform approaches
adopted in prior law, and to enact provi-
sions that were thought to give Colorado
consumers additional protections not found
in the Official Text. As noted previously,
Colorado's version of Article 9 prohibits a
security interest in a consumer deposit ac-
count in any transaction, as well as a se-
curity interest in any other deposit account
in a consumer transaction or in any trans-
action in which the amount of the loan is
$100,000 or less.78
In a carryover from prior law, in other
than purchase money transactions a secu-
rity agreement of a married person must
be signed by both husband and wife if the
collateral is consumer goods other than
automobiles and the spouses are living to-
gether at the time.
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Neither prior Article 9 nor the Revision
attempts a comprehensive definition of
breach of the peace, but both statutes rec-
ognize that self-help repossession is not
authorized if it is accompanied by a breach
of the peace. Colorado's version of new Ar-
ticle 9 states that breach of the peace in-
cludes:
1) entering a locked or unlocked resi-
dence or residential garage;
2) breaking, opening or moving any lock,
gate or other barrier to enter enclosed
real property; or
3) using or threatening to use violent
means in connection with self-help
repossession.
A secured party engaging in any one of the
three prescribed activities is subject to a
penalty of $1,000. The same $1,000 penal-
ty is imposed on a secured party using a
uniformed law enforcement officer to as-
sist in self-help repossession.80 Other con-
duct may be held to constitute a breach of
the peace, but will not be subject to this
penalty.
Unlike the uniform version of revised
Article 9, Colorado provides in UCC § 9-
625(i) that, in a non-class action, the pre-
vailing party in an action challenging the
secured party's conduct is entitled to at-
torney fees. Those attorney fees are limited
to 15 percent of the unpaid balance of the
debt in certain transactions.
As noted previously, Colorado also has
changed the safe-harbor notice of disposi-
tion to expand the information given to
the consumer in connection with a foreclo-
sure sale. In addition, the time period with-
in which a secured party must respond to
certain demands of the debtor and the
means of relinquishing control over a de-
posit account are changed in the Revision.
Moreover, Colorado debtors are entitled to
make requests for accountings and simi-
lar items from a secured party on a more
frequent basis without charge, and the
maximum fee that may be charged for
such requests when the debtor has exceed-
ed his or her limit has been reduced from
$25 to $15.81
UCC § 9-333 of the Official Text gives
the holder of certain statutory hens, such
as the motor vehicle repairman's hen, pri-
ority over an Article 9 security interest,
unless the statute creating such lien ex-
pressly provides otherwise. Colorado re-
versed this priority scheme in former Ar-
ticle 912 to give priority to the Article 9 se-
curity interest unless the hen created by
statute expressly granted the statutory
lien priority over the security interest. The
UCC § 9-333, as adopted in Colorado, pre-
serves Colorado's historical non-uniform
grant of priority to the Article 9 security
interest.
As part of a foreclosure process, if a se-
cured party elects to disable or render un-
usable any collateral consisting of equip-
ment, it may not do so with respect to a
computer program or other similar device
embedded in the equipment if immediate
injury to person or property is a reason-
able, foreseeable consequence of such ac-
tion.8 3 This non-uniform amendment is
presumably designed to prevent the se-
cured party from disabling the software
that operates certain critical care equip-
ment in hospitals and the like without the
consent of the debtor.
Colorado's version of new Article 9 also
continues provisions regulating the dispo-
sition of manufactured homes and the su-
pervision and bonding of third party re-
possessors. The sole change in these non-
uniform sections is the increase in the re-
quired bond of a third-party repossessor
from $25,000 to $50,000.84
A list of the significant (and many of the
less significant) changes made by Colora-
do to the Revision can be found in the
Principal Colorado Variations to Revised
Article 9 ("Variations" chart) on pages 20-
22. This list is not exhaustive, but does
provide a preliminary look at those areas
the Colorado legislature thought deserved
special treatment in this state.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, this brief article
can provide only an introduction to the Re-
vision. As is true of a person to whom one
is introduced, many facets of new Article
9 are not apparent on a first meeting. In
any revision as complex as this one, prob-
lems are bound to emerge only in the con-
text of specific transactions. Almost cer-
tainly, amendments will be necessary to
clarify confusions and resolve ambiguities.
Readers who discover problems as they
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work with this statute are encouraged to
contact the authors.
NOTES
1. The revision will become effective in Con-
necticut on October 1, 2001, and in Alabama,
Florida, and Mississippi on January 1, 2002.
2. CRS § 4-9-109(a). In this article, citations
to Article 9 as it existed in Colorado on June
30,2001, will be prefaced by "previous."
3. Compare previous CRS § 4-9-104(k) and
(1) with CRS § 4-9-109.
4. E.g., the revision recognizes "electronic
chattel paper" as a specific category of collater-
al. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(31).
5. Previous CRS § 4-9-103(1).
6. As used in this article, the phrase "real
property-related collateral" means collateral
for which a fixture filing is made; timber to be
cut; and as-extracted collateral, such as miner-
als.
7. CRS § 4-9-301.
8. This term is defined in CRS § 4-9-102
(a)(73).
9. See CRS § 4-9-307(f) of the Delaware
Uniform Commercial Code.
10. CRS § 4-9-501(b). New Article 9 expands
the definition of transmitting utility to include
persons primarily engaged in the transmission
of "communications electronically, electromag-
netically, or by light," a change that would seem
to bring the activities of cable television and
fiber-optic network operators squarely within
the scope of the transmitting utility central fil-
ing regime. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(83)(B).
11. CRS § 4-9-702(a).
12. Because any financing statement filed
before July 1, 2001, that has not been contin-
ued will lapse before June 30, 2006, practitio-
ners may question when that date would ever
be the earlier date. In Sigman and Smith's com-
prehensive study of the transition rule, they
discuss the case of a financing statement filed
on August 1, 1996, and continued before July
1, 2001. In such a case, the lapse date for the
continued statement would be July 31,2006.
However, under UCC 9-705(c), its effectiveness
would end on June 30, 2006. See Sigman and
Smith, "Revised U.C.C. Article 9's Transition
Rules: Insuring a Soft Landing," 55 Bus.Law.
1065, 1087-88 (2000). In addition, some states
have extended the effectiveness of financing
statements for periods in excess of five years.
13. CRS § 4-9-705(a).
14. Previous CRS § 4-9-304(3).
15. CRS § 4-9-313(c).
16. CRS § 4-9-312(b)(1).
17. CRS § 4-9-108(e).
18. Revised Article 9 defines "amendment" to
include any change to the financing statement,
including assignments, continuations, termi-
nations, partial releases, and amendments.
CRS § 4-9-512(a).
19. Between July 1,1996, and December 31,
1999, Colorado authorized financing state-
ments covering non-real estate collateral to be
filed in any Colorado county, as well as with the
Secretary of State. Because the proper place in
Colorado to file a post-effective-date financing
statement covering such collateral is the office
of the Secretary of State (and only such office),
there exists the argument that "central" filings
made at the county level during this three-and-
one-half year period were not filed in the same
office as that prescribed by the revision. Al-
though the authors believe that this argument
should be rejected, until this issue is resolved,
it may be prudent for a secured party desiring
to continue or otherwise amend such a locally
fied financing statement to do so through both
an "in lieu" initial financing statement (dis-
cussed in the text accompanying note 24, infra)
and by means of a traditional Form UCC-3.
CRS § 4-9-707 (b) and (c).
20. CRS § 4-9-515(e).
21. CRS § 4-9-509(a).
22. See CRS § 4-9-512.
23. CRS § 4-9-705(f).
24. CRS § 4-9-706(a).
25. CRS § 4-9-706(b).
26. CRS § 4-9-706(c).
27. The National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws Enactment Guide
suggested adding a CRS § 4-9-710 that would
prescribe an extended period for retention of
such records. Some states have included this
provision. Colorado did not.
28. CRS § 4-9-707(c)(2).
29. CRS § 4-9-707(e).
30. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(29), (13), (78), (51), (46),
and (61).
31. Previous CRS § 4-9-106.
32. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(2).
33. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(29).
34. Previous CRS § 4-9-104(1).
35. A consumer transaction is a transaction
in which an individual incurs an obligation pri-
marily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses. A security interest secures the obliga-
tion, and the collateral is held or acquired pri-
marily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(26). This includes the
category of "consumer goods transaction" but
goes beyond that category to include collateral
other than consumer goods.
36. "Consumer deposit account" is a deposit
account held in the name of a natural person
and used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(22.5).
37. CRS § 4-9-109(d)(13).
38. CRS § 4-9-109(d)(13.5).
39. CRS §§ 4-9-109(e) and -703(c).
40. CRS § 4-9-318(a).
41.995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
42. CRS § 4-9-108(a).
43. CRS § 4-9-108(e).
44. CRS § 4-9-108(c).
45. See CRS § 4-9-108 (Official Comment 2).
46. CRS § 4-9-509(a).
47. CRS § 4-9-509(b).
48. CRS § 4-9-510(a).
49. See CRS § 4-9-625(b) and Id. at (Official
Comment 2).
50. No sanction is prescribed for the failure
of the filing officer to reject such a submission,
and if CRS § 4-9-502 is satisfied, the filing is ef-
fective. Hence, there is a sense in which rejec-
tion is "optional" with the filing officer.
51. CRS § 4-9-516(d).
52. CRS § 4-9-503.
53. CRS § 4-9-506(c).
54. Prior law left much to be desired in this
area. Minor errors that were not seriously mis-
leading were acceptable, but the decision as to
what was minor or seriously misleading was
made by the courts on an ad hoc basis. The un-
certainty of result encouraged litigation such
as Scott Truck & Tractor Co., Inc. v. Alma Trac-
tor & Equip. Inc., 35 S.W3d 815 (Ark. 2000),
where the Court questioned whether the omis-
sion of the suffix "Inc." from the debtor's name
on the financing statement was seriously mis-
leading, before ultimately concluding it was
not.
55. CRS § 4-9-509.
56. CRS § 4-9-309.
57. CRS § 4-9-312(a).
58. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(47).
59. CRS § 4-9-102(a)(49).
60. CRS § 4-9-328.
61. "Supporting obligation" is defined in CRS
§ 4-9-102(a)(80).
62. CRS § 4-9-104(b).
63. CRS § 4-9-106; CRS § 4-8-106(f).
64. CRS § 4-9-610(b).
65. CRS § 4-9-611.
66. CRS § 4-9-613.
67. CRS § 4-9-614.
68. The safe harbor forms are set forth in
CRS §§ 4-9-613 and -614.
69. CRS § 4-9-611(c)(3)(C).
70. CRS § 4-9-612.
71. CRS § 4-9-620.
72. See CRS § 4-9-620(b) (Official Text).
73. CRS § 4-9-620(f).
74. CRS § 4-9-626.
75. CRS § 4-9-616(b).
76. CRS § 4-9-628(d)(2).
77. CRS § 4-9-615(f).
78. The references to "loan" and "revolving
loan account"in CRS § 4-9-109(d)(13.5) suggest
that the restriction on use of a deposit account
as collateral in business transactions does not
apply to a credit extension that is not a loan,
such as a credit sale transaction.
79. CRS § 4-9-203(j).
80. CRS § 4-9-625(h).
81. CRS § 4-9-210(f).
82. Previous CRS § 4-9-310.
83. CRS § 4-9-609(e).
84. CRS § 4-9-629.
See Variations chart on pages 20-22.
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PRINCIPAL COLORADO VARIATIONS TO REVISED ARTICLE 9
1. § 9-102(6) Revised definition of As-extracted Collateral.
2. § 9-102(8.5) Definition of Business Day (New).
3. § 9-102(22.5) Definition of Consumer Deposit Account (New).
4. § 9-102(67) Deletion of definition of public-finance transaction.
5. § 9-108(b) The Secretary of State is authorized to establish collateral codes to identify categories of
collateral.
6. § 9-108(e)(3) Description of deposit account cannot be solely by type.
7. § 9-108(f) Consumer goods description must specifically identify and itemize such consumer goods.
8. § 9-109(d)(13) Consumer deposit accounts excluded as Article 9 collateral in all transactions.
9. § 9-109(d)(13.5) Deposit accounts excluded as Article 9 collateral in consumer transactions and in $100,000
or less business purpose loans.
10. § 9-109(d)(14) and (15) No Article 9 security interest may be taken in IRA or 401(k) plans.
11. § 9-109(e) Government debt excluded from Article 9.
12. § 9-201(b) and (c) Reference to "applicable rule of law" omitted.
13. § 9-203(j) Security interest in consumer goods owned by married person other than autos and other
than PMSI not valid unless security agreement signed by husband and wife.
14. § 9-208(b)(1) Time for secured party with control over a deposit account to respond to demand to release
control changed from 10 calendar days to 5 business days.
15. § 9-208(b)(2) Once debt satisfied secured party must transfer balance in controlled deposit account to
account in debtor's name if debtor so requests and provide sufficient information to debtor
to allow access to the account.
16. § 9-208(b)(2.5) Amount payable to debtor upon release of control of deposit account must include all inter-
est earned in account to extent not already credited or paid to debtor.
17. § 9-210(f) Each six months debtor or a person designated by debtor is entitled to make one free re-
quest for accounting, one for list of collateral and one for statement of account. Secured
party may charge up to $15 (down from $25) for each additional request per category.
18. § 9-313(j) Subsection clarifies that references in subsections (g) and (i) to possible violations of
debtor's rights are not to be construed as limiting debtor's rights if such violation actually
occurs.
19. § 9-317(a)(2) Colorado did not adopt provision that would give secured party priority over lien creditor
based on date of filing of financing statement if perfection occurs after date person becomes
lien creditor.
20. § 9-333(b) Subsection changed to give priority to security interest over statutory lien unless lien
statute provides otherwise.
21. § 9-334(j) Subsection deleted because Colorado is believed to have no crop mortgage law that is in-
consistent with § 9-334.
22. § 9-401(c) New subsection added to state that Article 9's override of contractual restraints on alien-
ation do not supersede any criminal sanctions applicable to a prohibited transfer or justify
a transfer otherwise in violation of law.
23. § 9-406 Workers' and Unemployment Compensation claims, tort judgments, and certain special
needs trust benefits not assignable notwithstanding § 9-406.
24. § 9-408 Workers' and Unemployment Compensation claims and certain special needs trust bene-
fits not assignable notwithstanding § 9-406.
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25. PART 5 Alternative B, with modifications adopted.
26. § 9-501 Secretary of State designated as central filing officer for purposes ofArticles 9, 9.3 and 9.5.
27. § 9-510(c) Exception noted to six month window to file continuation statement based on previous
nonuniform Colorado amendments. Historical interest only.
28. § 9-510(d) and (e) Reference made to prior Colorado nonuniform amendments. Historical interest only.
29. § 9-512(a) An amendment must identify all original financing statements (central and local) by file
number and date of filing. The amendment need not provide the information specified in 9-
502(b).
30. § 9-515 Reference to public-finance transactions deleted.
31. § 9-519 Check digit system must be in place by July 1, 2001. County clerks exempted from this re-
quirement.
32. § 9-521 The Secretary of State is authorized to adopt forms rather than making the forms a part of
the statute.
33. § 9-522 All filing officers (central and local) are required to be able to retrieve a record using the
name of the debtor, the file number assigned to the original financing statement, and the
date of filing.
34. § 9-523 The filing officer is required to maintain searchable records of federal tax lien notices as
well as financing statements. Also, the time period within which the filing officer must pro-
vide acknowledgments of filing, search certifications and the like is extended from 2 busi-
ness days to 5 business days. The written certifications option was selected in subsection
(d) and subsection (f) was revised to require sale of data only in electronic or digital medi-
um.
35. § 9-525 Filing and certification fees of the Secretary of State are to be determined from time to
time by the Secretary of State. County filing officers determine their fees, but such fees
may not exceed $10 for written filings, $15 for documents of more than 2 pages, and $5 if
the filing is electronic.
36. §§ 9-528,9-529,9-530 These are nonuniform provisions carried over from current Colorado law. Historical inter-
est only.
37. § 9-601 Breach of the peace is defined to include:
- entering a residence or residential garage
- breaking, opening or moving any lock, gate, or other barrier to enter enclosed real
property
- using or threatening to use violent means
38. § 9-603(b) Words "empower the parties to set standards affecting" substituted for "apply to."
39. § 9-604(d) Words "other than the debtor" stricken.
40. § 9-607 and 9-608 Word "reasonable" added before "attorney fees."
41. § 9-609(d) The current Colorado limitations on the repossession of manufactured housing are carried
over in this subsection.
42. § 9-609(e) Electronic repossession of embedded software is prohibited if immediate injury to person
or property is a reasonable foreseeable consequence.
43. § 9-610(e)(2) A foreclosure seller may disclaim or modify warranties only if done so before completion of
the transaction.
44. § 9-611(a)(2) For clarification, a reference to § 9-624(a) has been added.
45. § 9-611(d) The words "the creditor in good faith believes that the collateral" added before the words
"threatens to decline." In addition, a sentence added to state that each reference to good
faith does not abrogate secured party's general obligation to proceed in a commercially rea-
sonable manner.
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46. § 9-613(a)(3)(B) Minor errors are excused if they do not cause damages to person who relies on the erro-
neous information.
47. § 9-613(a)(5) The notice must state that the debtor may request an accounting by writing to a specific
address (as well as calling a specified telephone number).
48. § 9-614(a)(1)(C) and (D) The notice in a consumer-goods transaction must identify, among other things, a mailing
address of the secured party.
49. § 9-614(a)(3) An address for the secured party must be given. The bracketed language regarding
charges for explanations from the secured party has been changed to reflect the charges in
§ 9-210(f).
50. § 9-615(a)(1) The word "reasonable" added before "legal expenses."
51. § 9-616 The word "reasonable" added before "expenses" and "attorney fees."
52. § 9-616(d) Minor errors are excused only if they do not cause damage to person relying on them.
53. § 9-616(e) The debtor is allowed three responses without charge to a request for explanation of sur-
plus/deficiency amount in any six-month period. The maximum charge for excess requests
is reduced to $15 from $25.
54. § 9-620(b) This subsection is deleted preserving the argument that retention of collateral by secured
party may constitute acceptance of the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.
55. § 9-623(b) The word "reasonable" added before "attorney fees."
56. § 9-624(c) Subsection clarified to state that the waiver of the right to redeem is not allowed in a con-
sumer-goods transaction.
57. § 9-624(c)(2) The person designated by the debtor in accordance with § 9-210 may recover damages for a
secured party's noncompliance.
58. § 9-624(h) The penalty for committing any of the acts specified in § 9-601(h)(1), (2) and (3) or for using
a uniformed law enforcement officer in a self help repossession is $1,000.
59. § 9-624(i) The prevailing party in an action (other than class action) under § 9-624 is entitled to re-
cover legal fees, but such fees are capped at 15% in a consumer transaction.
60. § 9-624(j) The $500 penalty provided for in subsections (e) and (f) is indexed for inflation.
61. § 9-626(a) The word "reasonable" is added before "attorney fees."
62. § 9-626(b) A cross reference to § 5-5-103 of the UCCC is added.
63. § 9-628(c) The secured party may rely on a representation by the debtor in an authenticated record
indicating that a deposit account is not a consumer deposit account. The obligor's represen-
tation concerning the purpose for which an obligation was incurred must be in an authen-
ticated record.
64. § 9-628(d) This subsection is repealed effective July 1, 2003.
65. § 9-629 This nonuniform section carried over from existing Colorado Article 9 regulates reposses-
sion of collateral. The bond required of repossessors has been increased from $25,000 to
$50,000.
66. § 9-703(c) A subsection has been added to exclude governmental liens from Article 9.
67. § 9.3-103 Central Information System Board retains central filing officer oversight authority.
68. § 9.3-108 Provisions added to transfer certain filing office functions from Central Information Sys-
tem to Secretary of State.
69. § 9.5-103(7) Secretary of State is empowered to determine filing fees for Effective Financing State-
ments.
70. § 9.5-107 Sanctions for noncompliance increased to match more closely the new damage provisions
of Revised Article 9.
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